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1DELEGATING DEMOCRACY – THE SIPHONING OF IMMIGRATION POWER FROM 
CONGRESS TO THE STATES AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, AND THE NEED FOR A 
NEW APPROACH.
OLEG S. KOBELEV 
The question of who is and is not an American has occupied Americans and non-
Americans alike since the inception of the United States.1 Unlike many other nations we 
don’t define belonging based on particular criteria such as race, ethnicity, religion or 
bloodline.2 Instead the idea of who belongs and who doesn’t is defined by a vague, 
shifting and uncertain patchwork of laws, customs, history and assumptions that 
Americans, their government and immigrants make about what it takes to be an 
American.  This ambivalence about national identity is not confined to abstract questions 
of belonging. Ordinary Americans as well as their elected representatives in Congress 
face the question of who is and is not an American every time they confront uneasy and 
conflicting choices regarding immigration.  
Congressional ambivalence on these difficult issues often results in decisions that 
tend to delegate the bulk of the decision-making to administrative agencies and state 
 
1 In fact the Revolutionary War itself was probably the first of many battles to define who Americans really 
are as a nation, as a people, and as an idea. The adoption of Constitution, the Westward expansion, the 
Civil War, he Mararthy era, and the Civil Rights movement are but a few of seminal events in American 
history that continued to shape our perception of who is and is not American.  
2 For example, Germany, Switzerland  and Japan define citizenship primarily in terms of lineage or 
bloodline (jus sanguinis) as opposed to citizenship by birth (jus soli) in the United States. See German 
Embassy in Ottawa, at http://www.ottawa.diplo.de/en/04/citizenship_20law/UB_20citizenshiplaw.html 
(describing recent changes in German law allowing acquisition of citizenship by birth (jus soli) in addition 
to citizenship through bloodline); See also Gildas Simon, Who Goes Where at 
http://www.unesco.org/courier/1998_11/uk/dossier/txt21.htm (describing different models of citizenship 
based on blood and birth, using examples of Switzerland, Japan and others as countries defining citizenship 
in terms of bloodline).  
2governments,3 with Congress choosing to make vague pronouncements in hopes that they 
will satisfy constituents and the lobbyists alike.4 I call this approach “have your cake and 
eat it too,” because it allows Congress, faced with conflicting pressures coming from 
businesses, immigrant lobbies, and other stakeholders, to escape the responsibility for 
failures and take credit for successes of immigration policies. Congress manages to have 
its cake and eat it too at the same time as it shifts the brunt of the decision-making to state 
and federal agencies run by unelected bureaucrats. This ability of Congress to delegate 
broad legislative power to other branches of government lies at the heart of the ironically 
named non-delegation doctrine.  
Some courts and scholars think that this is a perfectly healthy way for a 
democracy to function, arguing that agencies’ particularized expertise in the field, the 
scale and sheer volume of regulation necessary, and the opportunity for deliberation 
inherently unavailable to a legislative body all require broad, general directives from 
Congress.5 Others, including this author, view the problem as a more fundamental failure 
 
3 See generally Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public 
Authority (New York: Norton 1969) (discussing the dangers of vagueness and generality of statutes that 
delegate power to agencies) (thereafter Lowi, The End of Liberalism).   
4 Id.
5 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.748, 758 (1996) ("To burden Congress with all federal rulemaking 
would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a workable National 
Government."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[I]n our increasingly complex 
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent 
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."). See also Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("The judicial approval accorded these 'broad' standards for administrative action 
is a reflection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social 
problems."); See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air, 54-58 (Yale 
University Press: 1981) (using case study of Clean Air Act to suggest that broad delegations to agencies 
may produce policy results superior to detailed legislated solutions, in part because of interest group 
influence on Congress). 
3of democracy, a symptom of government in crisis and the solution as a prescription to 
restore the system back to what it was originally intended to be.6
Whatever merits these competing theories present, the importance of the form and 
substance that Congressional delegation takes in relation to immigration cannot be 
overestimated, given the plenary power of Congress over the matter.7 People’s lives are 
literally at stake. Access to basic necessities of life is at stake. Child custody, health care, 
transportation and jobs are at stake. Truly, few other areas of Congressional delegation 
deal more directly with the most basic aspects of people’s livelihood than administrative 
agencies’ regulation of non-citizens.8 I shall argue that a different doctrine of delegation 
in the context of immigration and alienage law is necessary, if we are to fulfill our 
commitment to the democratic ideal of holding our government accountable to the wishes 
of the governed. 
To accomplish this goal, this paper will seek to both ask and answer two 
questions: (1) is plenary power Congress enjoys over immigration delegable and to 
whom, and if so (2) how? The answers to these two questions underline the essence of 
the new delegation doctrine I propose. I will call it explicit delegation. I answer the first 
question in the affirmative, noting that nothing in either history or text of the Constitution 
precludes Congress from delegating its power to federal administrative agencies and the 
 
6 See e.g., Lowi, The End of Liberalism, supra note 3; Devid Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: 
How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993) (proposing strict non-delegation doctrine as a 
way to police abuses in government); See also Thomas W. Merril, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097 (2004) (arguing for a new exclusive 
system of delegation to correct past problems) (hereinafter Merril: Exclusive Delegation).  
7 See e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 580 (1889) (stating that any attempt to restrict Congressional 
power to exclude aliens would be a diminution of the sovereignty of the United States); see also Oceanic 
Steam Navigationn Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (“over no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens].”). 
8 For example U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Department of Homeland Security division) 
administers programs as diverse as adoptions, naturalization and citizenship, refugees and asylum petitions, 
issuance of employment visas and others. Immigration and Services Benefits at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/index.htm.   
4states in the same manner. The second and an equally difficult question concerns the 
extent and the nature of Congressional delegation. Here I shall argue that Congress needs 
to adopt explicit delegation doctrine as a principle vehicle for delegating legislative 
power to both federal agencies and state governments. 
Part I of this paper begins with the general contours of the existing delegation 
doctrine and then focuses on the delegation of plenary power of Congress over 
immigration and alienage law in both intra-federal and federal-to-state regimes. I used 
restrictions on employment of aliens to illustrate the general principles of delegation. Part 
II begins with the discussion of weaknesses of the non-delegation doctrine and proposes 
explicit delegation as a new and more desirable alternative. In this context I discuss the 
implications and the practicality of extending the reach of explicit delegation to both 
intra-federal and federal-to-state levels, arguing that exclusivity of immigration power in 
federal government requires explicit delegation, but does not bar delegation altogether. 
Finally, Part III discusses of the role of the judicial review of agency and state actions 
pursuant to Congressional delegation under the new regime of explicit delegation. I 
conclude with a discussion of reasons why delegating power to both State and federal 
administrative agencies would not just be a more doctrinally consistent approach, but 
would also increase transparency and efficiency of our government, given the new 
regimes of judicial review I proposed.   
Part I: Non-Delegation - a Story of the Most Mislabeled Doctrine in American 
Jurisprudence   
Section A - Nature and history of federal delegation – a legacy of doctrinal confusion 
5The Constitution assigns all legislative powers of the federal government to 
Congress. Section 1, Article I of the U.S. Constitution states this much: “All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall 
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”9 For over two centuries the Supreme 
Court viewed this clause, however, to mean that Congress could vest the executive 
branch of government with its legislative authority, as long as there was some intelligible 
principle guiding this delegation.10 The rationales for such delegation differed. In its early 
days the Court preferred the detail-filling rationale, according to which the Court found 
that Congress could delegate to administrative agency the power to “fill-up” the details in 
the legislative scheme.11 The justification for this “fill-up” rationale that became popular 
in the midst of the progressive era of the 20th century was that objectivity and expertise of 
administrative agencies made delegation desirable.12 As such, in Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States13 the Court stated that the long terms of commissioners on Interstate 
Commerce Commission were not just permitted but desirable because it allowed the 
Commissioners to acquire the necessary expertise.14 The Court likewise noted that 
Federal Trade Commission allowed the creation of a pool of experts “appointed by law 
and informed by expertise.”15 
The Court envisioned only one conceivable limit on the authority of Congress to 
delegate its lawmaking power to administrative agencies – namely that such delegation 
 
9 U.S. Const. Art I, §1 
10 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: a Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1403 (2000) (thereafter Schultz: Schechter Poultry). 
11 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (granting federal courts an authority to adopt their own rules 
of process); Buttfiled v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upholding delegation to “establish uniform 
standards” for importing tea). 
12 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935). 
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
6follow “an intelligible principle.”16 Incidentally, the definition of intelligible principle 
was so vague that only two decisions in the entire history of non-delegation doctrine have 
ever been stuck down as violating it, and both arose from the same statute – National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).17 In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,18 the Court stuck 
down section 9(c) of the statute, which authorized the president to restrict interstate 
transportation of oil produced in violation of state law.19 In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States,20 the Court invalidated section 3 of the statute, authorizing President to 
approve “codes of fair competition” proposed by private industry groups.21 The Court 
based its decision in the two cases on the fact that neither section gave the executive any 
guidance on how to exercise discretion.22 Furthermore, section 3 of the statute 
specifically allowed the President to pass the authority to a private industry group to 
make the standards and then simply approve them without any additional review.23 The 
Court viewed that as tantamount to delegating legislative authority to a private group or 
an individual.24 
After this brief flirtation with non-delegation, the Court never again invalidated a 
Congressional delegation of power even where the standards for such delegation were 
very vague. As such, the proverbial “line in the sand” between the statutes that the Court 
was willing to strike down and the ones it was willing to enforce was the difference 
 
16 Hampton Jr. & Co v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  
17 Schultz: Schechter Poultry, supra n. 10 at 140.   
18 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
19 Id. at 430.  
20 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
21 Id. at 538-39. 
22 Id. at 551 (“The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized 
within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant . . .  .") (Cordozo, J., concurring).  
23 Id. at 541-42. 
24 Id. (finding that such delegation to be  “utterly inconsistent with constitutional prerogatives…of 
Congress.”). 
7between having vague standards and having no standards at all.25 The willingness of the 
Court to uphold the very broad and vague delegation of legislative power essentially 
created two parallel sources of legislation – one administrative and one Congressional.26 
To escape the problems posed by the text of the Constitution, which seemed to expressly 
prohibit this exact situation,27 the Supreme Court deemed the exercise of legislative 
power by the administrative agencies to be quasi-legislative, while labeling the power of 
Congress legislative.28 Of course the distinction is meaningless, especially in view of 
decision in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the one Congressional attempt to establish a 
real difference between the two systems in the form of a legislative veto.29 As such under 
the current non-delegation doctrine the legislative power exercised by the administrative 
agency is functionally the same as the legislative power of Congress.  
The modern rationale for the existence of delegation is primarily practical. The 
current regime is essential, in the words of Justice Scalia,30 because of “the functional 
centrality of delegation in our modern system of government.”31 Simply stated, without 
delegation doctrine federal government simply would not be able to function. This 
 
25 In Loving v. United States, the court upheld a delegation to the President to define what ‘aggravating 
factors” would permit the death penalty in court martial without any further guidance. 517 U.S. 748, 768-
69 (1996). Similarly in Mistretta v. United States, the Court upheld a delegation to the Sentencing 
Commission to “promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense” without any other 
guidance. 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989). 
26 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workman v. Connaly, 337 F.Supp. 737, 745 (1971) (“There 
is no analytical difference, no difference in kind, between the legislative function—of prescribing rules for 
the future—that is exercised by the legislature or by the agency implementing the authority conferred by 
the legislative).  
27 US Const. Art I, §1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”) 
28 Humphrey’s Executor v. US, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935); See also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 
n.16 (1983) (noting Court’s use of term “quasi-legislative”). 
29 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
30 A former administrative-law professor himself  
31 Mistretta v. United States 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1989). 
8explanation, however, does little to explain the remarkable vagueness of standards 
governing delegation.  
It was the constitutional and administrative law scholars of all stripes who 
attempted to provide an explanation. Some like Schoenbrod32 see delegation as a sign of 
sick democracy and Congress as abdicating its Constitutional responsibilities.33 They 
accuse Congress of intentionally using non-delegation to claim credit for benefits and 
escape the blame for shortcomings and failings.34 Schoenbrod likewise claims that 
Congress deliberately delegates in a ploy to shift the blame for the burdens that 
legislation imposes, intentionally structures its delegation authority in a way that any 
administrative action will benefit special interests, and makes delegation so incoherent as 
to prevent the agency from adopting rules that would burden the industry.35 Yet others, 
particularly Mashaw and Schuck argue that delegation does not threaten democracy. 
Mashaw argues that presidential oversight of agency action ensures democratic 
accountability, and in fact makes agencies more responsive to democratic pressures.36 
This is so, according to Mashaw, because, as one person, the President is inherently more 
visible than 435 separate members of Congress, and thus is more accountable for the 
failing of his administrative state.37 Shuck claims that agency rulemaking is more 
responsive to the public interest than Congressional legislation because agencies are more 
accessible to interest groups and ordinary citizens than members of Congress since the 
 
32 David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through 
Delegation (1993) (hereinafter Schoenbrod: Power Without Responsibility). 
33 Id. at 187. 
34 Id. at 16. 
35 Id.
36 Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance 132 (1997). 
37 Id.
9costs of participation are much lower.38 Further, agency heads are not dependent on 
campaign donations for their continued employment, which, in turn, reinforces their 
relative imperviousness to industry pressure.39 
Scholarly debate notwithstanding, it is clear that non-delegation doctrine in 
general faces significant problems. These problems are even more acute in the context of 
immigration and alienage law, where plenary power doctrine allows delegation of 
unprecedented amount of power to administrative agencies. I will now turn to the 
discussion of plenary power of Congress over immigration and alienage law and its 
unique relationship with the delegation doctrine.  
Section B: Sources and dimensions of plenary power  
The Supreme Court once remarked that “over no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens].”40 
This pronouncement best captures the scope and the breath of power that Congress 
exercises over immigration and alienage regulation. Remarkably, the doctrine of plenary 
power showed little signs of fading since its introduction at the end of 19th century, and 
remains as potent today as it its inception in 1889.41 Interestingly, while the breath of 
plenary power doctrine has rarely been questioned42 the exact Constitutional source of its 
legitimacy remains unclear. The sources often cited include the actual text of the 
 
38 Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 
783-90 (1999). 
39 Id.
40 Oceanic Steam Navigationn Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). 
41 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms 
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 554 (1990) (hereinafter Motomura: Phantom Norms). 
42 See e.g., Justice Jackson’s dissent in Shaughhnessy v. United States ex. Rel. Mezei, 354 U.S. 206, 224 
(1953) (arguing for more substantial due process than what was granted under the banner of plenary power 
doctrine).  
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Constitution,43 foreign commerce power,44 and the dubiously named inherent sovereignty 
principle,45 also sometimes referred to as extra-constitutionality principle.46 
Despite uncertain origins, however, Constitutional dimensions of plenary power 
have been well established. As such, while the Chinese Exclusion Case47 stands for 
proposition that federal government is unconstrained in its discretion regarding categories 
for the admission of aliens,48 in Nashumura Ekiu v. United States,49 the Court extended 
the purview of plenary power to cover procedures for enforcing admission criteria 
entrusted to agency officials.50 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,51 the Court applied 
plenary power doctrine in the context of deportation of aliens, holding that deportation 
did not constitute punishment for the purposes of due process of the 5th amendment, and 
thus was immune from judicial review.52 Ominously stating that “whatever procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” the 
Court further “clarified” the due process requirements for aliens detained at the border in 
 
43 U.S. Const. Art I §8 cl. 4 (“Congress shall have power…[t]o establish an [sic] uniform rule of 
Naturalization.”)  
44 In perhaps the earliest formulation of what was to become plenary power doctrine the Court in 1884 
Head Money Case upheld a federal statute imposing tax on owners of vessels that transported foreign 
passengers into the US, holding that transportation of foreign passengers was “part of commerce with 
foreign nations.” 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
45 Responding to the challenge to Congressional law banning immigration of Chinese laborers, including 
those who have previously been admitted into the U.S, the Supreme Court in Chinese Exclusion Case 
stated that any attempt to restrict congressional power to exclude aliens would be a diminution of the 
sovereignty of the United States. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
46 The principle was articulated in a case of Curtis-Wright, where the Supreme Court stated that the idea of 
federal government as a government of limited power was only accurate in the context of internal affairs 
because those powers were taken from the realm of powers that originally belonged to the individual states 
or colonies. However, because foreign affairs powers, including immigration were never the states’ to 
begin with (having passed directly from the English Crown to the colonies as a whole) and thus were 
“extra-constitutional.” 29 U.S. 304 (1936). 
47 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
48 Id. at 604 (“United States, in their relation with foreign countries and their subjects…[is] invested with 
powers…the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and 
security.”) 
49 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
50 Id. at 660.  
51 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
52 Id. at 715. 
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Knauff v. Shaughnessy53 and substantive categories for deportation in Harisiades v. 
Shaghnessy.54 
Overall, Congressional power over immigration law, especially in the context of 
delineating admission categories for aliens has been virtually unconstrained in its 
discretion. I shall now turn to the discussion of the consequences and application of the 
plenary power to delegation in intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts, using 
employment of non-citizens (an alienage law issue) as, hopefully, a representative 
example of the general delegation regime.  
Section C – Delegation of immigration and alienage power to administrative 
agencies in intra-federal context 
The power of Congress to delegate its legislative authority to administrative 
agencies in the context of alienage law has seen very few limits. This, of course, is 
unsurprising, given the Court’s view of the plenary power doctrine as a guiding principle 
of immigration and alienage law.55 The restrictions on hiring of non-citizens in federal 
government, both far-reaching and comprehensive, may serve as a good illustration of 
this general principle. The restrictions begin with Congress56 and the President,57 and end 
up affecting virtually every level of federal government.58 The reason for this is because 
 
53 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
54 342 U.S. 580 (1952). The court did grant limited due process safeguards in Yamataya v. Fisher, however 
for those aliens who are located inside the United States. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
55 See Section B, infra 
56 In fact every appropriation bill since 1939 had Congressional ban on employing certain non-citizens in 
federal positions within continental United States, with each agency having responsibility apply the law, 
Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum on Federal Employment of Non-Citizens, at 
http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/Citizen.htm  
57 Executive Order 11935 (September 2, 1976) restricts the employment of non-citizens into "competitive 
service" positions covered by Title 5 of the U.S. Code.  This applies to all agencies with competitive 
service positions, any place in the world. 
58 Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum on Federal Employment of Non-Citizens, at 
http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/Citizen.htm (noting that implementing policies prescribed by 
Congressional ban on hiring of non-citizens is responsibility of each individual agency).  
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Congress gave the President authority to regulate executive branch employees, and 
delegated broad rule-making power to the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”).59 
Pursuant to that authority OPM, in conjunction with the executive order 11935, barred 
admission into federal civil service of non-citizens as a way to “best promote the 
efficiency of the service.”60 
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,61 the Supreme Court upheld the principle of such 
delegation, holding that presidential authorization would be sufficient to justify certain 
hiring restrictions.62 Individual agency regulations precluding employment of non-
citizens who were not permanent residents were likewise upheld for constitutionality, 
although remanded to see if they were within statutory authorization.63 The only obvious 
limitation on the agency’s discretion to discriminate appears to be the Court’s insistence 
that there is a legitimate basis to presume that discriminatory rule thus promulgated was 
intended by Congress to serve that interest.64 Importantly, however, the Court in 
Hampton stuck down a Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens in federal 
employment,65 demonstrating that the usual deference the Court accorded to agency’s 
discretion would be stripped if exercised improperly. The Court noted that because the 
Commission had “no responsibility for foreign affairs…establishing immigration quotas 
or conditions of entry, or naturalization process” it operated outside the purview of 
 
59 5 U.S.C. § 5115. Congress, however, retains significant authority over the terms and conditions of federal 
employment. See 5 U.S.C. pt. III. 
60 5 U.S.C.A. §3301(f) 
61 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
62 Id. at 104-105 (“[petitioners] correctly state that the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive 
positions clearly justifies a citizenship requirement in at least some parts of the federal service, and that the 
broad exclusion serves the valid administrative purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of classifying 
those positions which properly belong in executive or sensitive categories.”). 
63 Toval v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 F.3d. 1271 (1993).
64 Id. at 1278. 
65 426 U.S. 188, 116-17 (1976) 
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authority given to it by Congress,66 underscoring the point that the potency of the 
authority delegated pursuant to the plenary power doctrine had to be tempered by a sound 
decision-making process.   
The Hampton decision was not an isolated case. The Court had consistently 
shown its willingness to scrutinize agency interpretation arising out of Congressional 
delegation where rights of aliens were concerned. In a whole series of cases preceding 
Hampton, the Court in Bridges v. Waxon,67 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,68 Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGrath,69 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,70 and Woodby v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service71 read statutes authorizing administrative restrictions on aliens 
narrowly, repeatedly construing the statutes in favor of aliens.72 In his article detailing 
these cases73 Professor Hiroshi Motomura argues that a possible explanation for the 
Court’s behavior was the influence of “phantom constitutional norms” – real 
constitutional norms coming from a mainstream public law that the Court could not 
directly apply in interpreting immigration statutes because of the plenary power 
 
66 Id. at 114. 
67 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (overturning the deportation of a union activist Harry Bridges under the statute 
authorizing deportation on grounds such as membership and affiliation with organizations that teach the 
overthrow of the United States Government by force; noting the harsh consequences of deportation, despite 
the Courts own refusal to equate deportation with criminal punishment).  
68 333 U.S. 6, 7 (1948) (holding that, given harsh consequences of deportation, statutes and regulations that 
are ambiguous on exact grounds for deportation must be read in light most favorable to the aliens).  
69 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (holding that a combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial roles by immigration 
inspectors in some deportation cases conflicted with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) 
separation-of-functions provisions, despite the fact that by its terms APA only applied to “adjudication 
required by the statute,” and there was little indication, outside the court’s own insistence, that a 
deportation hearing was so required.) 
70 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (overturning the government’s denial of entry to Chew, a returning permanent 
resident, without a hearing and as prejudicial to public interest, holding the authorizing statute ‘s provisions 
allowing denial of admission without a hearing not applicable to Chew).  
71 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (requiring that standard of proof the government must meet in deportation proceeds 
was “clear…convincing evidence” rather than “preponderance of evidence, as the government had 
suggested claiming that such a reading was consistent with what the Congress intended when passing the 
statute.) 
72 Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41, at 573. 
73 Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41, at 567-73.  
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doctrine.74 I believe that an alternative or, perhaps, concurrent explanation stems from the 
Court’s general concern over vague and overbroad Congressional delegation of the 
legislative power to administrative agencies in the context of plenary power doctrine – a 
kind of  “phantom non-delegation doctrine with teeth,” where the Court, unwilling or 
unable to deal with the failings of non-delegation doctrine directly, instead turned to 
scrutinizing agency interpretation as a way to alleviate its concerns.  
Section D – Delegation of immigration and alienage  powers to the states  
In a general context of federalism, the principles of concurrent powers presuppose 
that States can act within their police powers unless preempted by Congress pursuant to a 
valid constitutional delegation such as immigration power.75 As such, Congress can 
empower the states to act by either direct delegation or by withholding the exercise of its 
power.76 The primary vehicle for Congress to delegate its powers to the states consists of 
allowing or authorizing state action in aid or supplementary to federal legislation.77 
Examples include the Congressional delegation of authority to define elements of federal 
crime,78 conforming federal land requirements to local and state laws,79 and making it a 
federal crime to violate a state wildlife statute.80 One circuit court went as far as to say 
 
74 Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41 at 573.  
75 See e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power and the 
Constitution, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 205, 226 (1997). 
76 Id.
77 Kramer v. United States 245 U.S. 478 (1918). 
78 United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1996) ( allowing states to define elements of federal 
crime, in penalizing possession of a firearm by a person convicted of federal crime, in penalizing the 
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year). 
79 Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905) ("It is not of a legislative character in the 
highest sense of the term, and as an owner may delegate to his principle agent the right to employ 
subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to 
the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands.”). 
80 United States v. Guthrie 50 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995) (allowing a federal statute that makes it unlawful to 
deal in any fish or wildlife taken in violation of any state law or regulation, holding that such a statute does 
not represent a true delegation of Congressional power). 
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that non-delegation issues are not implicated at all where Congress delegates power to the 
states, insofar as such delegation is consistent with the principles of federalism.81 
In this permissive environment, the early history of state regulation of alienage 
law may serve as a useful example. Historically, in the absence of federal legislation, 
state regulation of employment of non-citizens has been marked by blatant racism, 
discrimination and prejudice. In Heim v. McCall82 the Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court’s decision that labor law prohibiting employment of aliens on public works 
contracts was valid because the state was deemed to have the same right to discriminate 
in hiring as a private individual.83 The tide has turned in the second part of the 20th 
century, as courts began to increasingly scrutinize states’ discrimination of aliens, 
holding that such discrimination must be justified by a compelling state interest and be 
narrowly tailed to its avowed goal.84 
The courts had followed two primary rationales in overturning these state statutes: 
(1) violations of equal protection of the 14th amendment,85 and (2) conflicts with the 
federal scheme occupying the field or preemption.86 The two seminal cases breaking new 
 
81 Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benev. & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d 
1406 (6th Cir. 1994). 
82 88 Misc. 291 (1915), affirmed 239 U.S. 175 (1915). 
83 Id. at 194. See also Rok v. Legg 27 F. Supp. 243 (1939), Aron v. Leavy 219 Cal. 456 (1933), Lee v. 
Lynn 223 Mass 109 (1916), People v. Crane, 214 NY 154 (1915). 
84 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
85 Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State 71 Cal. 2d 566 (1969) (holding to be denial of the equal protection of the 
law statutory provisions prohibiting the employment of aliens in public works); See e.g., Moham v. Parks,
352 F. Supp. 518(1973) (invaliding the ordinance restricting municipal employment to citizens of United 
States); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (1972) (invalidating Arizona statute preventing non-citizens 
from being employed upon or in connection with any state, county or municipal work or employment); 
Orlando v. Florida, 751 F. Supp. 974 (1990) (holding Florida statutes requiting public employees to take a 
loyalty oath that recites that employee is a citizen of the state and imposes immediate sanction and 
discharge on employees who fail to take oath to be a facially unconstitutional restrain of freedom of legal 
aliens to obtain public employment); Fernandez v. Georgia, 716 F. Supp 1475 (1989) (holding that George 
statute restricting opportunity to become state trooper to native-born U.S. citizens to violate the rights of 
equal protection of foreign born naturalized applicants).  
86 Teitscheid v. Leopold 342 F. Supp. 299 (1971) (invaliding state law prohibiting employment of aliens on 
both 14th amendment and supremacy clause grounds, holding that such law served no compelling state 
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ground on the issue were Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission87 and Graham v. 
Richardson.88 In Takahashi the Court struck down a statute that denied fishing licenses to 
non-citizens, holding that lawful admittance into the country entitled aliens to equal 
protection under state laws.89 In Graham the Court deemed classifications based on 
alienage to be subject to strict judicial scrutiny because non-citizens constituted a discrete 
and insular minority.90 
Nonetheless, not all state regulation of non-citizen employment has been 
restricted. The Court viewed restrictions on certain jobs as acceptable because those jobs 
served a primarily political function, and subjected such restriction to a much more 
deferential rational level of review.91 Jobs such as probation officers,92 school teachers,93 
and state troopers94 can thus be restricted to citizens only, although, for no clear reason, 
jobs such as lawyers95 cannot. Furthermore, and perhaps far more importantly, the Court 
proved to be far more sympathetic to state regulation of alienage and immigration law 
where it viewed implicit Congressional acquiescence as a possible justification.  
 
interest and denial of work clearly created burden on aliens that Congress did not anticipate, impinging on 
federal immigration process.  
87 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
88 403 U.S. 365 (1971).  
89 Takahashi, at  419-420.  
90 Graham, at 371-72 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938)). 
91 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 433, 439 (1982).  
92 Id. (holding that State statutes requiring that state’s “peace officers”, including deputy probation officers 
in particular be US citizens are constitutional).  
93 Ambac v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (noting that state barring non-citizens from serving as 
public teaches is subject to rational basis review only).  
94 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 293, 300 (1978) (prohibiting non-citizens from serving as state troopers 
serves a rational purpose).  
95 In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding Connecticut’s exclusion of aliens from the practice of law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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As such in De Canas v. Bica,96 the Supreme Court upheld California statute 
penalizing employees for hiring illegal immigrants, reasoning that not all state laws 
affecting non-citizens constitute attempts to regulate immigration. The court established a 
three prong test to determine the constitutionality of state legislation: (1) state law may 
not regulate immigration; (2) even if the statute did not regulate immigration it may still 
be overturned if Congress explicitly stated its intent to occupy the field in such a way that 
“complete[ly] oust[ed]”97 state power, and (3) the state law cannot serve as an “obstacle” 
to the federal immigration policies.98 
Section E: Structural bias as a possible explanation for differences in judicial 
treatment of Congressional delegation in intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts.
The remarkably deferential treatment afforded to federal restrictions on 
employment of non-citizens points to a very definite structural bias in the courts’ thinking 
when compared to the high scrutiny similar restrictions receive in the state context. This 
bias consists of an underlying presumption that while plenary immigration power 
imposes few limits on federal authority to discriminate, the question of whether such 
power could be delegated to the states, not to mention be exercised in absence of 
Congressional declaration, is far from settled.99 
96 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (“The Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals 
with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether 
latent or exercised.”).  
97 Id. at 356-58 (The evidence of such ouster can be shown by either legislative history or the text of the 
statute.). 
98 Id. at 363-65. 
99 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State 
Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 
191, 207, 310 (suggesting that the issue of whether plenary power of the states could be delegated had not 
been settled by the Supreme Court, arguing that no such delegation is possible) (hereinafter Loudenslager: 
State Interests and Federalism).  
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The source of structural bias affecting the analysis of the constitutionality of state 
alienage classifications begins with the two decisions the Supreme Court reached in 
Graham v. Richardson100 and Mathews v. Diaz.101 In Graham the Court held that a state 
classification based on alienage is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause,102 while in Mathews the Court found that the same classification if done by 
federal government is subject only to rational basis of review.103 The doctrinal confusion 
that ensued following these two decisions concerned the level of review the courts should 
apply in situations where the states are carrying out an explicit Congressional policy. If 
the resulting classifications are seen as incidents of federal policy, seemingly the 
deferential rational basis of review in Mathews should apply. But what about the Graham 
dicta which evidences the Court’s constitutional concern that the uniformity requirements 
in the Naturalization Clause prohibit the federal government from authorizing the states 
to adopt divergent policies affecting aliens?104 
Recently two courts have reached cardinally different results on this very issue, 
with the New Your Court of Appeals deciding in Aliessa v. Novello105 that Congress may 
not delegate its plenary immigration power to the states thus leaving state’s classification 
of aliens subject to strict scrutiny under Graham,106 whereas in Soskin v. Reinertson, the 
 
100 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
101 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
102 Graham at 371-72. 
103 Mathews at 82-83.  
104 “[U]nder Art.I, §8, cl 4, of the Constitution, Congress’ power is to establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.” Graham, at 382 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618, 641 (1969)) The often quoted 
Court’s pronouncement in Graham that “Congress does not have the power the authorize the individual 
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause,” is of less concern since it does not directly contradict the 
decision in Mathews. Id. Instead this pronouncement assume conclusion to a question of what level of 
scrutiny the courts should afford to the determination of whether a federally authorized state alienage 
classification violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. See also, Developments in Law – Jobs and Borders, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 2247, 2253 (2005).   
105 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
106 Id. at 1095. 
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Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected Aliessa, in upholding a Colorado statute’s alienage 
classifications, finding the appropriate standard of scrutiny to be rational basis in 
Mathews.107 
In Aliessa the state of New York administered a state-funded supplemental 
Medicaid program that provided benefits to individuals whose incomes did not qualify 
for Federal Medicaid but fell below the statutorily defined “standard of need.”108 
Following the passage of PRWORA,109 the state eliminated this supplemental coverage 
for qualified aliens under the five-year bar who had arrived after PRWORA’s enactment, 
thus making alien eligibility the same as in federal Medicaid program.110 New York State 
Court of Appeals, responding to the equal protection challenge by Aliessa plaintiffs, held 
the state statute unconstitutional,111 explicitly relying on Graham’s dicta referencing 
“explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”112 The Court reasoned that allowing 
New York to determine for itself the extent to which it can discriminate against aliens 
would be a direct contravention of the uniformity requirement of Naturalization clause, as 
it would potentially create wide variation among the states regarding alien’s eligibility to 
welfare.113 Since Congress was not allowed to delegate plenary power in such a way as 
to violate the Naturalization clause, the state’s alienage classification was without 
Congressional authorization and thus warranted strict scrutiny under Graham.114 
In Soskin the state of Colorado had decided to continue to provide federal 
Medicaid coverage to qualified aliens even though § 1612 of PRWORA authorized the 
 
107 353 F.3d. 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004).  
108 Aliessa, 754 N.E.3d at 1089.  
109 
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1096-98. 
112 Id. at 1097 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971)). 
113 Id. at 1098. 
114 Id. at 1095. 
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state to deny such coverage.115 However in 2003, due to large deficits, the state 
legislature reversed it decision, limiting its coverage to what PRWORA required.116 
Responding to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Challenge, the Court stated that Congress 
was empowered to pursue national policy stated in PRWORA, and that the state’s refusal 
to provide optional benefits was in line with Congressional concern (and not just state 
concern) that “individual aliens not burden the public benefit system.”117 The court 
directly rejected Aliessa non-uniformity analysis, stating that uniformity concerns were 
misplaced because both the states were not given unlimited discretion,118 and that 
reliance on Naturalization clause as a source of Congressional authority was erroneous 
because Naturalization clause was not the only source of immigration power, and that 
distribution of welfare benefits bore no direct relationship to the naturalization process.119 
It is evident that the outcome of these two cases is the direct consequence of the 
structural bias running through the courts decisions, namely the assumption that the 
nature of intra-federal delegation of plenary power is somehow fundamentally different 
from federal-to-state delegation. While the results the courts had reached in Aliessa and 
Soskin were cardinally different, both courts showed the same bias - viewing the nature 
and the extent of Congressional delegation of plenary power to state entities as 
fundamentally different from intra-federal delegation. In the reminder of this paper I 
reject this structural bias, arguing that nothing in either history or sources of plenary 
power precludes Congressional delegation to both federal agencies and state governments 
on an equal footing as long as the extent of that delegation is made explicit.   
 
115 353 F.3d. 1242, 1246. (10th Cir. 2004). 
116 Id.
117 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1601(4) (2000)). 
118 Id. at 1255. 
119 Id. at 1256. 
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Part II: Explicit Delegation and the Need for the Rule of Uniformity  
Section A: The case for explicit delegation and the search for doctrinal 
consistency.  
 The present state of non-delegation doctrine in immigration and alienage law 
leaves much to be desired. Perhaps one of the most acute problems with the current state 
of affairs is the crisis of legitimacy that arises from the combination of broad 
Congressional delegation to federal agencies and the plenary power Congress wields on 
this issue. The consequence is that, given judicial unwillingness to enforce non-
delegation, Congress is basically siphoning its legislative power to other branches in the 
context where its power is at its peak, and virtually unchecked by judicial review.120 
Imagine if Congress decided to delegate its power to declare war to an individual state, or 
to one particular member of the executive branch!  
The problem is symptomatic of the current state of non-delegation doctrine as a 
whole. The disconnect between the principle of non-delegation from which the doctrine 
derives its name, and the practical reality of having essentially two parallel legislative 
systems – one Congressional and one administrative, creates a serious crisis of legitimacy 
within the Federal government. If non-delegation doctrine truly mandates that Congress 
cannot siphon off its legislative power to other branches then all three branches of 
governments are involved in a massive constitutional violation of immense proportions. 
The entire administrative state is basically a constitutional abomination, where Congress 
is abdicating its constitutional duty to legislate, administrative agencies are exercising 
 
120 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workman v. Connaly, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745 (1971) (“There 
is no analytical difference, no difference in kind, between the legislative function—of prescribing rules for 
the future—that is exercised by the legislature or by the agency implementing the authority conferred by 
the legislative.”). 
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authority they don’t have, and the judiciary is letting them to get away with it. The crisis 
of legitimacy is heightened in the immigration context, given the stakes and magnitude of 
the power involved, where the tension between the need for delegation and the 
importance of controlling the scope of this delegation is particularly acute. 
 Of course it would be madness to deny the practical need for the administrative 
state, especially in the context of immigration and alienage law. Massive administrative 
bureaucracy is essential to handle the inflow of immigrants, their registration, 
naturalizations and processing of their applications.121 We need administrative agencies 
to process visas abroad, decide who comes and goes of the country, and have access to 
intelligence to weed out potential security threats. Furthermore, we need agencies that 
can act quickly on potential security threats arising in immigration context – a function 
for which a bi-cameral processes of legislation is ill-suited.  
 The tension between the need for delegation and the importance of controlling its 
scope is equally high in the context of delegation of the federal alienage power to the 
states. The federal government often needs state assistance and expertise in distribution 
of social services and welfare benefits to immigrants. If we enforce the non-delegation of 
immigration power too rigidly, the states would not be able to implement their own 
programs in helping immigrants in ways that go beyond the “floor” of federal assistance, 
thus dramatically affecting thousands if not hundreds of thousands of immigrants 
depending on such benefits.   
 A new approach is needed to reconcile the doctrinal underpinnings of non-
delegation doctrine in immigration and the practical realities of non-enforcement of this 
 
121 For example, Homeland Security processed over 13 million US citizens and 21 million aliens in the 
month of September 2004 alone. Fiscal Year End Statistical Reports, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/msrsep04/index.htm. 
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doctrine. This doctrine should be able to address the concerns that critics have with the 
current doctrine,122 and yet retain sufficient flexibility for the administrative state to 
function. As such the doctrine will first preserve the functionality of the administrative 
state, acknowledging the value of expertise and deliberation inherent in agency decisions, 
and the reality of the need for agency delegation given the sheer scale and volume of 
necessary regulation. Second, it will ensure greater Congressional accountability by 
requiring that delegation be explicit, and forcing Congress to specify the exact 
dimensions of its delegation authority.  
I draw on the principles articulated by Professor Thomas W. Merrill (who calls it 
exclusive delegation) in his article proposing the creation of a new delegation doctrine123 
to argue that establishment of a new explicit delegation doctrine in the context of 
immigration and alienage law may be able to solve some of the structural problems and 
biases I outlined earlier. Explicit delegation doctrine consists of two principles: anti-
inherency and transferability. Anti-inherency simply means that judicial and executive 
officials will have no inherent authority to act with the force of law, unless they can trace 
such authority to some provision of enacted law. Transferability means that Congress has 
power to vest executive and judicial officers with authority to promulgate legislative 
regulations functionally identical to the statutes. Adoption of these two principles would 
ensure that Congressional delegation is explicit in its form, clearly articulating the scope 
 
122 Merril: Exclusive Delegation, supra n.6. See also discussion regarding the crisis of legitimacy 
surrounding the current non-delegation doctrine above and again in Part I, Section A of this paper.  
123 Merril: Exclusive Delegation, supra n.6. at 2101 (arguing for a new exclusive system of delegation to 
correct past problems). My decision to change the name of the doctrine from exclusive to explicit reflects 
my belief that the principle benefit of this doctrine would be the clarity it would provide in delineating 
authority granted to administrative agencies and state governments). 
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of the power being delegated (transferability), and the authority to which this power is 
being delegated to (anti-inherency).  
 Section B: Benefits of explicit delegation 
 I believe that the principle benefit of the explicit delegation doctrine is that it 
provides a coherent theoretical foundation for a practice in which Congress, the judiciary 
and the executive branch are already involved. The cardinal difference lies not in the 
scope of powers Congress can delegate but in the way Congress describes those powers. 
In this context explicit delegation may placate critics of weak non-delegation doctrine 
who see it as a loophole for Congress to abdicate its constitutional and democratic 
responsibility for making policy choices. Indeed, explicit delegation’s first principle of 
anti-inherency makes it harder for Congress to disclaim responsibility, since for Congress 
to vest federal agency or a state with the power they need, Congress must explicitly 
delegate the authority to act legislatively and precisely delineate the scope of authority to 
be exercised. As such, monitoring and control of Congressional delegation would be 
more clearly on display, and thus would make it more accountable for policy choices that 
it makes.  
 Explicit delegation may also better promote the role of checks and balances in the 
federal government, as well as in the larger context of federalism.124 Critics of current 
non-delegation doctrine assert that one of its weaknesses is that it encourages Congress to 
give away too much power to the executive – creating a dangerous strain on the system of 
checks and balances.125 Explicit delegation doctrine’s principles of anti-inherency and 
transferability, however, help to ensure that such siphoning of democracy does not 
 
124 Merril: Exclusive Delegation, supra n.6 at 2100.  
125 See e.g., Devid Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through 
Delegation (1993) (proposing strict non-delegation doctrine as a way to police abuses in government) 
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happen, forcing delegation to be couched in terms that are both specific and definite. 
Given the institutional reluctance of any branch of government to give away too much of 
its power in favor of another branch and the fact that Congress cannot delegate power to 
itself in avoidance of bicameralism and presentment126 – Congress will have an inherent 
incentive to carefully regulate how much power it delegates to other branches and states, 
as well as a powerful defense against any unauthorized grab of power (anti-inherency 
principle). Finally, explicit delegation, by the virtue of transferability principle, allows 
the same degree of flexibility and efficiency as weak non-delegation. It preserves the 
administrative state and federal-to-state delegation, only asking for a specific grant of 
authority in return.  
Section C: Explicit delegation and constitutional sources of its two guiding 
principles: transferability and anti-inherency   
 In his article Professor Merrill establishes two guiding principles framing the new 
doctrine: anti-inherency and transferability. The anti-inherency principle states that 
judicial and executive officials have no inherent authority to act with the force of law and 
must always trace such authority to some provision of enacted law.127 Support for anti-
inherency principle in the Constitution can be traced all the way back to the Youngstown 
decision,128 where Justice Jackson in his famous concurrence established the tripartite 
analysis of executive power.129 There Justice Jackson stated that Presidential and thus the 
executive power is at its peak where President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, and his power is at its lowest ebb where President takes 
 
126 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
127 Merril: Exclusive delegation, supra n.6 at 2101. 
128 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
129 Id. at 588. (1952). 
26
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress.130 The twilight zone 
of presidential authority, according to Jackson, lay in the middle where Congress has not 
spoken and the president could only rely on his own independent powers (whatever they 
may be).131 
In immigration context, given the plenary power of Congress in immigration and 
alienage matters, the independent authority of the executive branch seems somewhat 
diminished outside explicit Congressional authorization, considerably shrinking the 
“twilight zone”. Possible exceptions may include incidents where President’s control 
over immigration is moored less in Congressional authorization and more in independent 
sources of authority stemming from the emergency powers of the president.132 
The transferability principle states that Congress has the power to vest executive 
and judicial officers with authority to promulgate legislative regulation functionally 
identical to the statutes.133 The concept of transferability is nothing new and hasn’t been 
in doubt, at least when it comes to questions of intra-federal delegation. As such, in 
United States v. Gramaud134 Congress authorized an agency to promulgate rules that 
were enforced by criminal sanctions. In Mistretta v. United States,135 the court said as 
much explicitly – “rulemaking power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes 
an executive function only when delegated by the Legislative Branch and becomes an 
executive function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch.”136 
130 Id. 
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Merill: Explicit Delegation, supra n. 6 at 2101.  
134 110 U.S. 506, 521 (1911). 
135 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
136 Id at 386 n.1 
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In terms of delegation of immigration power from Congress to the states, the issue 
is more complicated. At least one state supreme court 137 and some critics138 charge that 
Congress may not delegate immigration power to the states since that would violate the 
uniformity requirement of Naturalization Clause139 of the Constitution.140 More 
specifically, they allege that the whole concept of plenary power is predicated on the 
notion of uniformity that framers sought to grant to Congress as a way to prevent each 
state from adopting its own rules of immigration.141 The problem with this criticism 
however is that it suffers from a fallacy of overgeneralization. While the reasoning is 
sound when it is applied to the immigration law that deals with the actual processes of 
naturalization given that the Naturalization Clause,142 when read in conjunction with 
Necessary and Proper Clause,143 allows Congress to make rules relating to the procedural 
and substantive process of naturalization itself.144 However, the scope of the 
Naturalization Clause with its attendant uniformity requirement must be read narrowly; 
leaving questions of treatment of aliens in alienage law contexts such as access to public 
 
137 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1094-95, 1098 (N.Y. 2001). 
138 See e.g., Loudenslager: State Interests and Federalism, supra n.99, at 297 (arguing that Congress may 
not delegate to the states the power that the states would not be able to exercise because of the 14th 
amendment in absence of such delegation). 
139 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization"). 
140 Loudenslager: State Interests and Federalism, supra n.99, at 314. 
141 Id.
142 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization"). 
143 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 19 (stating that Congress shall have power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution…all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States.”). 
144 See Chadha v. I.N.S, 634 F.2d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Naturalization Clause, when read in 
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, gives Congress considerable power over aliens." 
(citations omitted) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-95 (1977))); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
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services, jobs and other benefits outside the scope of the clause and thus subject to 
delegation unconstrained by the uniformity requirement.145 
There are two additional reasons why the scope Naturalization Clause should be 
read narrowly. First, historically the purpose of the Naturalization Clause was to curb 
potentially dangerous consequences of having states with divergent naturalization rules in 
light of the Comity Clause in the Articles of Confederation (similar to privileges and 
immunities clause)146. Prior to the adoption of the Naturalization Clause, an alien could 
forum shop from one state to another until he (and in those times it was invariably he) got 
the favorable determination, which was then binding on every other state.147 Second, the 
uniformity requirement does not explain the judicial tolerance for divergent state policies 
toward undocumented aliens. For example in De Canas v. Bica148, the court has upheld a 
California law criminalizing the employment of illegal aliens. Other sources of 
immigration power are also unconvincing –nothing in foreign affairs power, foreign 
commerce clause or inherent sovereignty power places a categorical ban on 
Congressional power to authorize states to adopt alienage classifications. For example, 
the argument that the Compact Clause149 creates a negative implication that devolution of 
other foreign affairs powers to the state is not very convincing, since Constitution 
explicitly prohibits states from engaging in other enumerated foreign affairs activities 
such as entering into treaties and alliances and granting Letters of Marque and 
 
145 Developments in Law – Jobs and Borders, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2247 (2005). 
146 Articles of Confederation art. IV, para. 1 (U.S. 1781) 
147 The Federalist No. 42, at 238 (James Madison). The Federalist No. 42, supra note 93, at 237-39; The 
Federalist No. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[I]f each State had power to 
prescribe a distinct rule, there could not be a uniform rule." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 36 
(1824) (emphasis added).  
148 424 US 351, 355 (1976). 
149 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep Troops, or 
Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.") 
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Reprisals.150 As such, if anything, the implication from such explicit bars would be that 
foreign affairs powers that are not barred are in fact permitted.151 
A useful analogy could be Congressional power to delegate control over Indian 
affairs to individual states, pursuant to its plenary power. As in immigration, Indian law 
is an area where government’s plenary power enables it to classify individuals in ways 
that “might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.”152 In Yakima the court upheld the 
statute authoring states to extend criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands, holding 
that Congress may chose to readjust allocation of jurisdiction between states and tribes.153 
Professor Wishnie154 challenges this analogy, and argues that the difference in 
immigration context is that immigration is an exclusive power that may not be delegated 
in the same manner as a power over Indian affairs.155 This objection misses the point– the 
exclusivity dimension of the non-delegation doctrine of immigration applies only to 
naturalization requirements itself (consistent with the historical purpose of the uniformity 
clause). However, when it comes to a broader spectrum of rights arising out of alien’s 
classifications – access to jobs and welfare being the prime example, Congressional 
power to delegate is not so limited.  
Overall, I believe that explicit delegation doctrine and its twin principles of 
transferability and anti-inherency is applicable in both intra-federal and federal-to-state 
contexts. The bottom line is that, if these two principles are to be taken seriously, 
Congressional delegation will have to be much more explicit in its form, clearly 
 
150 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8. cl 11.  
151 Developments in Law – Jobs and Borders, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2247, 2267 (2005). 
152 Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439  US  463, 501 (1979). 
153 Id.
154 Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, 
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493 (2001) 
155 Id. at 563-64. 
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articulating the scope of the power being delegated (transferability), and the precise 
authority to which this power is being delegated (anti-inherency).  
Part III – judicial review under the new regime of explicit delegation 
 Section A: The role of judicial review in the context of delegation 
 Given the emphasis that explicit delegation doctrine places in ensuring 
transparency and accountability of Congressional delegation in both intra-federal and 
federal-to-state contexts, the role of the judicial review of agency or state action pursuant 
to such delegation becomes critically important. I believe that in instances where 
Congress adopts explicit delegation as a way to delegate its legislative power to either 
administrative agency or a state, judicial review of agency’s or state’s regulation pursuant 
to that delegation must follow a deferential standard first articulated in the famous 
Chevron156 case. However, if Congress chooses to follow the current “intelligible 
principle” standard when delegating its power in immigration or alienage law context, 
courts should apply a more searching scrutiny, asking whether agency’s or state’s 
decision is motivated by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest.157 
Of course one must first examine the current state of judicial review to be able to 
extrapolate the shape such review may take in the context of explicit delegation.  
Section B: Judicial review in the current non-delegation regime.  
The weakness of the current non-delegation doctrine led the Court to adopt rules 
that would allow it to review and invalidate agency decisions that it viewed as stemming 
 
156 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (adopting a two-step 
deferential approach to reviewing agency decisions:  In the first step, the court asks whether Congress has 
spoken to the precise issue or has left a gap for the agency to fill. If Congress has in fact spoken clearly on 
the issue in question, then that meaning is dispositive, regardless of what the agency has to say. If however, 
and most often, the legislative provision is ambiguous, the second question of Chevron is whether the 
agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable). 
157 See e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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from too broad a reading of delegating statute in question. In other words, the courts 
changed the focus of the non-delegation doctrine from reviewing the Congressional 
delegation to reviewing agency’s interpretation of such delegation.158 Given the demise 
of legislative veto in Chada159 judicial review effectively became the only check against 
administrative agency’s action outside the bicameral process of legislation and 
presentment.160 When reviewing interpretations that agencies make in the context of their 
delegated power, the courts often follow a two step process: they first look at the canons 
of judicial interpretation to avoid invalidation of Congressional delegation, and then 
apply Chevron161 standard of review when examining the administrative action stemming 
from such delegation.  
When applying the canons of judicial interpretations, the courts use clear-
statement rule and cannon of avoidance to ensure that whatever Congressional delegation 
is passed, it is upheld. In Kent v. Dulles,162 the Court applied the canon of clear-statement 
and refused to construe a broadly worded statute to permit the Secretary of State the right 
to travel, although the statute authorized the secretary to issue passports according to the 
rules set by the President, who, in turn, gave the Secretary discretion to deny passports 
for any reason.163 The Secretary used that discretion to deny passports to members of 
Communist party.164 The court construed the statute narrowly, citing Panama Refining165 
as a precedent for “important constitutional questions” a broader reading would have 
 
158 See, Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2110-15 
(1990). 
159 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
160 Id. 
161 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
162 357 US 116 (1958). 
163 Id. at 129. 
164 Id. at 123 
165 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
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entailed. The court held that in cases where individual liberties may be curtailed, 
Congress needs to make a “clear statement” to that effect in the statute.166 Canon of 
avoidance is another theory that allows the Court to avoid interpretations that are 
constitutionally suspect on the legal fiction that Congress would not have intended such 
interpretations.167 
The Chevron review of agency actions stems from, perhaps, one of the most 
significant cases of the 20th century Chevron, USA, Inc., Co. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council.168 The outcome of that case signaled a new regime for reviewing agency’s 
interpretations of federal statutes. In Chevron the Court announced that it will defer to a 
reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms, and devised a two-step 
way for determining when this deference should be exercised.169 In the first step, the 
court asks whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue or has left a gap for the 
agency to fill.170 If Congress has in fact spoken clearly on the issue in question, then that 
meaning is dispositive, regardless of what the agency has to say.171 If however, and most 
often, the legislative provision is ambiguous, the second question of Chevron is whether 
the agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable.172 
Although deferential in principle, Chevron has been often circumvented by judges 
both on the left and right who disagreed with the agency interpretation. As such, Justice 
 
166 Id. at 129. 
167 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 US 173, 191 (1991) (Upholding federal regulations that prohibited programs that 
received federal funds from engaging in specified abortion-related conduct and counseling, stating that 
regulations were based on a permissible reading of the statute.). 
168 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
169 Id. at 842-43.  
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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Stevens in I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonesca,173 rejected INS’s statutory interpretation of the 
words “well-founded fear of prosecution” as flatly wrong.”174 When interpreting the 
statute INS attributed the same meaning to the phrase as the mandatory-asylum provision 
of the statute, which prohibited deportation of any alien who showed a “clear probability 
of persecution.”175 Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was some 
ambiguity in the statute, he nonetheless felt that text and legislative history made it clear 
what the “right” meaning of the term was.176 Justice Scalia had likewise refused to defer 
to agency interpretation of a seemingly ambiguous statute in Maislin Indus. v. Primary177 
Steel, where he refused to show deference to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s take 
on the word reasonable as used in Interstate Commerce Act.178 
Overall, the judicial review regime currently in place effectively transfers the 
authority over the final say regarding the specifics of delegation from Congress to the 
Courts. Faced with exceedingly vague Congressional declarations, agencies are often at 
the mercy of the ideological winds of the federal courts who end up to be the final 
arbiter’s of what the Congress “meant to say” when in reality Congress said precisely 
nothing.   
Section C: Judicial review in the context of explicit delegation 
In the context of explicit delegation in immigration and alienage law, the courts 
should apply Chevron deference much in the same manner it has been applied before. 
The difference lies not in the new standard but in the increased guidance that 
 
173 480 US 421 (1987). 
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34
Congressional delegation would contain. Such guidance would make the firs step of 
Chevron applicable in more cases, and where it would not be – it would make the 
interpretation of what Congress considered reasonable that much clearer. The courts 
would then have a much easier time reviewing the agency’s decision based on what 
Congress actually meant to say, instead of substituting their own versions of what 
Congress intended in its vague proclamations over the similar guesses of the agencies.  
The real difference will come when agency decisions stem from Congressional 
declaration that does not follow the explicit delegation doctrine, but instead relies on the 
vague pronouncements of the old non-delegation principles. In this latter case, the courts 
should review the agency’s decisions dealing with immigration and alienage law 
applying the strict scrutiny standard, first articulated in this context in Graham179 to 
police against Congress trying to siphon its plenary immigration power in a 
constitutionally prohibited manner.  
Crucially, this two-tiered system of judicial review should apply with equal force 
to Congressional delegation of immigration power to agencies and the states. As was 
previously argued, nothing in either naturalization clause, history or original intent of the 
framers precludes Congress from delegating its plenary power to either states or federal 
agencies on the equal basis.180 The current regime of judicial review of Congressional 
delegation to the states remains confused and mangled at best – the decisions in Aliessa181 
179 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
180 See discussion in Part II, section A, infra.
181 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that in enacting Title IV of Personal responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”) the Congress has impermissibly delegated critical 
immigration policy powers to the states.).  
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and Soskin182 provide apt demonstration. It would therefore follow that the courts should 
apply the same standards of review of delegation in both contexts, removing the need for 
doctrinal confusion that began with the Graham/Mathews decisions and continues to this 
day in Aliessa and Soskin.
Conclusion 
We are a nation of immigrants. This phrase has been repeated so often that it has 
become a cliché, yet it is almost universally accepted as true.183 Another phrase that often 
accompanies the first one is that we are all Americans. An outsider is likely to conclude 
after hearing these two phrases together that we are a nation of immigrants who are all 
Americans. Ironically, this would be wrong. Instead, the idea of who belongs and who 
doesn’t is defined by a vague, shifting and uncertain patchwork of laws, customs, history 
and assumptions that Americans, their government and immigrants make about what it 
takes to be an American.  
This ambivalence about national identity coupled with the tremendous power that 
Congress wields on issues pertaining to immigration and alienage law makes the need for 
transparency pertaining to how and to whom Congress delegates its power particularly 
acute. Indeed, legislative transparency is the only way to ensure that Congress remains 
accountable for the legislative choices that it makes on these difficult issues. The current 
state of Congressional delegation in the context of immigration and alienage law is too 
 
182 353 F.3d. 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Colorado’s decision to continue to provide federal 
Medicaid coverage to qualified aliens who had resided in the United States for longer than five years, even 
though §1612(b) of PRWORA’s authorized the state to deny coverage to such aliens.) Id. at 1246. 
183 Of course, Native Americans, the first true settlers of the continent may disagree. One may argue, 
however, that even they are, in the broadest sense, immigrants – having traversed the Bering straits some 
30,000 years ago to settle the Western Hampshire. Smithsonian Institution, Paloamerican Origins, at 
http://www.si.edu/resource/faq/nmnh/origin.htm.  
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vague and inconsistent to meet the standard of democratic accountability that is required 
given the plenary power of Congress over the matter. 
This article sought to present an alternative way to frame Congressional 
delegation of plenary power  - a way in which Congress can delegate its power in both 
intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts, as long as such delegation remains explicit. I 
called this view explicit delegation. I believe explicit delegation is a better way to achieve 
legislative transparency, which is a necessary check on plenary power of Congress over 
the matter.  
The first part of my proposal deals with the way Congress delegates power. In this 
context I argue that explicit delegation, with its principles of anti-inherency and 
transferability, while functionally preserving the current administrative state, would 
provide a coherent doctrinal backdrop for the Congress to justify its delegation practices. 
The second part of my proposal suggested that adopting explicit delegation as a principle 
vehicle for delegating power would allow Congress to delegate its plenary power on an 
equal basis to federal agencies and individual state governments.  
Finally, the third part of my proposal outlined the level of judicial review the 
courts should exercise when reviewing agency’s or state’s decisions pursuant to 
Congressional delegation of power in matter of immigration and alienage law. As such, I 
suggest that where Congress adopts explicit delegation as means of transferring its power 
to either a state or a federal agencies, the courts should adopt deferential standard of 
review first articulated in the famous Chevron case, where reviewing the interpretation 
the state or the agency make of the authorizing statute. On the other hand, where 
Congressional delegation falls short of this standard, the courts should exercise the strict 
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scrutiny of the kind articulated in Graham when assessing the state’s or agency’s 
interpretation of the statute in question.  
 I believe that adoption of explicit delegation as a principle lens through which 
courts view Congressional delegation of its legislative authority in the context of 
immigration and alienage law will placate numerous critics of the current non-delegation 
doctrine, preserve the functionality and flexibility of the current administrative state, and 
allow the states the flexibility they need to deal with immigration and alienage law issues 
particular to their unique environments. Most importantly, I believe Congressional 
delegation that is clear about the extent and the source of the authority it delegates will 
make American democracy stronger by conferring a great degree of legitimacy to the 
agencies’ and states’ actions resulting from such delegation.   
